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Abstract

Lucky: The Sequel is a review essay based on Alice Sebold’s 1999 memoir Lucky
in which Sebold describes her own rape as a college student, her experiences as a
rape victim and her navigation of the legal system. Chamallas uses Sebold’s rape
narrative to explore themes of particular interest to feminist legal scholars. She
discusses the intersection of race and rape, the continuing controversy surrounding the categorization of rape as a crime of violence versus a sex crime and the
usefulness of considering the social and cultural dimensions of the trauma of rape.
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INTRODUCTION
1

I was struck by how much it
seemed to me to be a sequel to Susan Estrich’s influential book, Real
Rape.2 Although the books were written over a decade apart, each of
the authors wrote of her brutal rape by a stranger. In both cases, the
women were young. Sebold was only a freshman in college and
Estrich was just getting ready to enter law school when the attacks
occurred.3 In both cases, the rapist was an African-American man and
the victim was a white woman. In Estrich’s case, the rapist was never
found.4 In fact, the starting point for Estrich’s book is that, in
comparison, she is “lucky” to have been a victim of a stranger rape
When I read Alice Sebold’s memoir Lucky,

1
* Robert J. Lynn Chair in Law, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University.
Many thanks to Susan Appleton, Debbie Brake, Sharon Davies, Marc Spindelman, Peter
Shane, and Stephanie Wildman for their helpful suggestions on this essay. I am also indebted
to my colleagues at Ohio State who attended the summer brown-bag session and responded
to an earlier draft of this essay. Finally, I am very grateful to Amanda Klase for her excellent
research assistance.
ALICE SEBOLD, LUCKY (1999).
2
. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987).

3
4

. Id. at 6;see SEBOLD, supra note 1, at 3.
. Estrich, supra note 2, at 3.
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because she was more likely to be believed than a woman who was
raped by a man she knew.5 Estrich made the now-familiar assertion
that, under the law, acquaintance rapes are not regarded as “real
rapes” and devoted her book to describing the inadequacies of the
law and the ways to change it.
In Alice Sebold’s case, she saw the man who raped her on the street nearly six
6
months after the crime took place. He was charged and ultimately

convicted and given the maximum sentence.7 In this respect, Sebold’s
story reads like a sequel to Estrich’s story in which the rapist is
caught. At first blush, it also seems to bear out Estrich’s prediction
that victims of stranger-rapes can get justice, at least when the
defendant is black and the victim is white. But Sebold does not
believe she was “lucky”: her title is meant to be ironic, a bleak
rejoinder to those who expressed the view that she was lucky to be
alive.8 Sebold’s story vividly recounts her experience as a rape
victim, the multiple harms of rape, and the effects that the trauma of
the rape had on her life over the long term.
Although Sebold’s book is not a legal analysis or critique, it deals at length with
her navigation of the legal system, from police investigation to trial and conviction.
Sebold’s account shows that even for the “perfect” victim, who is young, white,
and a virgin, an encounter with the law can be exceedingly tough and that it is not
only acquaintance-rape victims who find it hard to see the process through.
Additionally, the fact that Sebold’s rape occurred after the first feminist-inspired
rape reforms of the 1970s meant that she was afforded a rape crisis counselor and a
feminist district attorney who treated her with understanding and respect. These
supports, however, did not bring closure or significantly lessen the injury produced
by her attack. Her story suggests that, even if the challenges faced by victims of
date and stranger rape differ in certain respects, the similarities are striking.
I believe that we are currently experiencing a backlash with respect to the issue
of rape and its victims. The Kobe Bryant case dramatically demonstrates that

5

. Id. (“In many respects I am a very lucky rape victim, if there can be such a thing.
Not because the police never found him: looking for him myself every time I crossed the
street, as I did for a long time, may be even harder than confronting him in a courtroom. No,
I am lucky because everyone agrees I was ‘really’ raped. When I tell my story no one doubts
my status as a victim.”).
6
. SEBOLD, supra note 1, at 103.

7

. Id. at 201 (“It was the maximum for rape and sodomy: eight and a third to
twenty-five years.”).
8
. Id. at 3. Lucky begins with the following paragraph:
“In the tunnel where I was raped, a tunnel that was ONCE an underground entry
to an amphitheater, a place where actors burst forth from underneath the seats
of a crowd, a girl had been murdered and dismembered. I was told the story by
the police. In comparison, they said, I was lucky.”
Id.

http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art15

9

Before the
criminal charges were dismissed in that case, the defense challenged
Colorado’s rape shield law as unconstitutional10 and numerous media
reports suggested that the pendulum of the law has swung too far
toward victim’s rights and now unduly prejudices defendants.11 In a
no-holds barred defense, issues critical to rape reform surfaced—
including the relationship between force and consent12—as did the
specter of racial bias influencing the prosecution and jury.13
skepticism towards rape victims has resurfaced with a vengeance.

Additionally, in this post-feminist, postmodern era, some critics on the “left”
14
have also raised doubts about the strategic value and validity of rape trauma.

Queer theorists and other critical scholars have lamented that we live
in a “trauma culture” and have suggested that feminist discourses of
9
. See Kirk Johnson, Bryant Case Alters Rape Counselors’ Work, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
22, 2004, at A11 (“issues raised by the case have seeped in so completely . . . they have
altered . . . how sexual assault victims think about their choices, their prospects of recovery
and themselves.”).
10
. See Charlie Brennan, Privacy Rights Next in Bryant Case; Much of Two-Day
Hearing to be Held Behind Closed Doors, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 26, 2004, at 22A.
11
. See, e.g., Cathy Young, How Much Should We Know About the Sex Life of Kobe
Bryant’s Accuser?, SALON.COM, INC. (Mar. 26, 2004), at http://www.salon.com/mwt/feature/
2004/03/26/rape_shield/index_np.html.
12
. Under Colorado law, recently revised in 2000, a defendant commits the crime of
sexual assault if “the actor causes submission of the victim by means of sufficient
consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim’s will.” COLO.
REV. STAT. ' 18-3-402(1)(a) (2000). The crime is enhanced if the submission is caused by
the “actual application of physical force or physical violence.” COLO. REV. STAT. ' 18-3402(4)(a). Notably, Colorado’s new statute does not explicitly require the prosecution to
prove that the victim did not consent and does not require the application of physical force to
convict on the underlying crime, without enhancement. Bryant has urged an interpretation of
the statute that would allow proof of consent as an affirmative defense and would also
require the prosecution to prove that Bryant knew that the victim did not consent. See
Defendant’s Submission of Revised Elemental and Related Consent Instructions (June 7,
2004) (on file with author) and Defendant’s Correction to Submission of Revised Elemental
and Related Consent Instructions (June 11, 2004) (on file with author). The prosecution has
argued that it need only prove that defendant’s conduct was sufficient to cause the victim to
submit, thereby avoiding use of the “consent” terminology. The prosecution also takes the
position that Colorado law does not require proof of mens rea—that is, proof that Bryant
knew that the victim was not consenting to intercourse. People’s Brief in Opposition to
Defendant’s Proposed Element Instruction and In Support of the People’s Proposed
Instructions (June 7, 2004) (on file with author).
13
. See Barry Bortnick & Dan Mangan, Team Kobe Plays the Race Card, N.Y. POST,
June 22, 2004, at 7.
14
. See WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE
MODERNITY (1995); MARK SELZER, SERIAL KILLERS: DEATH AND LIFE IN AMERICA’S WOUND
CULTURE (1998); Lauren Berlant, The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy, and Politics,
in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 105 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002). For an
insightful critique of the postmodern stance towarde rape, see Carine M. Mardorossian,
Toward a New Feminist Theory of Rape, 27 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOC’Y
743, 756–66 (2002).
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trauma serve to prolong, and even to produce, the suffering of rape
victims.15
It is against this backdrop that I present this review of Sebold’s powerful
narrative and my reflections on what it means for legal feminists who continue to
struggle with their understanding of rape at a time when the law of rape is once
again a matter of intense public debate and scrutiny. Our culture is full of rape
narratives, mostly gleaned from reported cases and media stories of current trials.
Sebold’s story stands out, however, because of its thick descriptions and
psychological insights, detailing how she felt to be a rape victim, how others
responded to her, and how the law constructed events. My particular focus is on the
book’s contributions to feminist theoretical debates about rape, what it potentially
adds to the portrait of rape and rape law that can be gleaned from feminist writings
since the first reforms in the 1970s.
After initially presenting a summary of Lucky and what I extract as its major
themes, I take up three issues that recur in feminist commentary on rape. The first
treats the always-difficult issue of the intersection of race and rape. Like so many
cases, race was central to Sebold’s case, as much as she might have wished it were
not. It affected how the police investigated the case, how the attorney for the
accused structured his defense, and the credibility of Sebold as the victim, even in
this stranger-rape prosecution where consent was not at issue. Interestingly enough,
Lucky indicates that the high potential for racial bias in our criminal justice system
can negatively affect not only minority defendants but white victims as well, whose
accounts are, not surprisingly, often viewed as tainted by racism.
The second issue I explore is the continuing controversy surrounding the proper
categorization of rape as a crime of violence as opposed to a sex crime. A popular
refrain of early feminist reformers in the 1970s was that rape was violence, not
16
sex, and that confusing the two minimized the harm of rape and

contributed to a culture with a penchant for blaming the victim and
normalizing rape. A main objective of this wave of reform was to
“de-sexualize” rape and to expose its high incidence in the United
States. This simple emphasis on violence was challenged in the 1980s
by Catharine MacKinnon’s influential, feminist account of rape as a
manifestation of eroticized dominance and as inseparable from
prevailing conceptions of sex.17 MacKinnon’s account highlighted
that many encounters, particularly of the date and acquaintance
15

. See Brenda Cossman et al., Gender, Sexuality, and Power: Is Feminist Theory
Enough?, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 601, 613 (2003) (“I myself would want to get better
after an injury of that kind, not to suffer it forever, so here, again, I want to Take a Break
from these feminisms.”).
16
. See ANN J. CAHILL, RETHINKING RAPE 2 (2001) (discussing the “violence, not
sex” school of feminist philosophy generated by Susan Brownmiller’s book, Against Our
Will: Men, Women and Rape (1975)).
17
. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 173
(1989) (“Rape is not less sexual for being violent. To the extent that coercion has become
integral to male sexuality, rape may even be sexual to the degree that, and because, it is
violent.”).
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variety, that may have passed for “consensual sex” were forced and
unwanted from the perspective of the woman. MacKinnon’s
unearthing of the force beneath many “ordinary” sexual encounters
and her refusal to conceptualize sex and violence as dichotomous,
however, also tended to reinforce early feminists’ claims that rape
was a serious offense that caused harm rather than pleasure to its
victims. At least when it came to stranger rape, where there is no
preexisting relationship between the parties, one might have thought
that, by the 1980s, the older notion that rape was fundamentally
“about sex” had been laid to rest. Sebold’s story shows, however,
how traditional cultural views that conflate sex and rape are still with
us and may affect not only the recovery process for a rape victim, but
also the shape of the legal issues and strategy in a rape prosecution.
This reiteration of the sex/violence debate is particularly salient,
given that postmodern critics of sex regulation are beginning to talk
about rape and sexual harassment as “sex crimes” once again.18
The third issue generated by Lucky goes to the core of the subject and seeks to
deepen our knowledge of the harms of rape. For Sebold, reading Dr. Judith
19
Herman’s Trauma and Recovery was pivotal to her understanding and

theorizing of her own experience as a rape victim. In her famous
book, Herman likens the trauma of rape victims to that experienced
by combat soldiers, involving complex psychological and relational
dynamics that often affect persons years after the events. Since the
1980s, we have had available the labels of Post Traumatic Stress
Syndrome (“PTSD”) and Rape Trauma Syndrome to support our
understanding of rape as a grievous harm.20 This new understanding
has served to justify severe penalties for the crime of rape in the
United States today when there is no longer a consensus that a
woman’s worth or honor is linked to her virginity/chastity and thus
invariably destroyed by rape. Contemporary philosophical accounts
of rape now often describe rape as a violation of a person’s sexual
autonomy,21 discarding older notions of honor or purity. As some
18

. See Marc Spindelman, Discriminating Pleasures, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW 201 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva Siegel eds.) (critiquing Janet
Halley’s views on sexual harassment law).
19
. JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, M.D., TRAUMA AND RECOVERY (1992).

20
. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) first appeared in the American
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (3d ed.) (“DSM-III-R”), in
1980. Alan A. Stone, M.D., Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Law: Critical Review of
the New Frontier, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & THE LAW 23 (1993). Rape trauma
syndrome refers to the “acute phase of a clinically recognized PTSD subtype.” Id. at 27.
21
. See, e.g., DAVID ARCHARD, SEXUAL CONSENT (1998); STEPHEN J. SCHULHOPHER,
UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW (1998).
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feminist critics have long noted, however, these autonomy accounts
do not seem to capture the full dimension of the harm.22 For me,
Lucky begins to answer the question of why rape is such a big deal,
now that the stigma of the rape victim as “damaged goods” or
“unmarriageable” has been so thoroughly discredited. It elucidates a
harm to identity that, while socially constructed, can not easily be
shaken off and can prove devastating to victims, male and females
alike.23
I. THE MEMOIR
Many readers, like myself, probably discovered Lucky only after they had read
24
Alice Sebold’s acclaimed first novel, The Lovely Bones. The narrator in that

novel is a raped and murdered 14-year-old girl who describes and
interprets events as she looks down from heaven. She possesses a
kind of all-knowing victim’s perspective, rare in its comprehension of
the ramifications of violence on the lives of those connected to her.
Lucky displays the same keen victim insight as in The Lovely Bones
and leads us to understand how Sebold came to be so expert at
describing trauma and cataloguing social reactions to rape victims.
A. The Attack

22
. See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 100–09 (1997). See generally Lynne
Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 LAW & PHIL. 127 (1992); Emily C. Shanahan,
Stranger and Nonstranger Rape: One Crime, One Penalty, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1371
(1999).
23
. See CAHILL, supra note 16. Cahill writes:
“By locating the body as central to a woman’s identity, while not demanding
that such identity be unified or determined, contemporary feminist theories of
the body will approach rape as a crime not limited to an assault on women’s
sexuality, but as an assault on various but fundamental aspects of her embodied
selfhood.”
Id.; see also Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH L. REV. 1615 (2004)
(discussing sexual violence against men).
24
. ALICE SEBOLD, THE LOVELY BONES (2002).
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Lucky begins with an unusually vivid description of Sebold’s own rape. The
rape took place as Sebold was walking home one night from a party, just after
classes had ended for the spring semester at Syracuse. Sebold recalls that she was
grabbed from behind by a man with a knife who threatened to kill her if she
screamed. Despite the warning, Sebold initially screamed, kicked, and struggled to
get away. But her resistance only seemed to make her assailant angrier: in response
to her attempt to escape, the man pushed her down, pounded her head into the brick
path, and strangled her so that she momentarily lost consciousness. Grabbing her
by the hair, he then pulled her into a tunnel that was once an underground entrance
25
to an amphitheater.
At this point, Sebold gave up her physical resistance and sought to assuage the
26
attacker with words. Sebold’s recounting of what happened next is

exceptionally disturbing for what it reveals about the “negotiations”
between an attacker and his victim and the intertwining of violence
and sex. Sebold’s experience of the rape was so structured by a fear
of death that the legally significant act of penetration became just
another action in a sequence of horrors and indignities that she was
forced to endure.27 Her strategy was to survive, and she was forced to
improvise in ways that might not be immediately understandable,
until she explained them. For example, when the rapist was having
trouble getting her belt undone, Sebold volunteered to do it, in a sad
and futile attempt “[t]o have him let go of me, for him to leave me
alone.”28 Prefacing why she complied with the rapist’s demands to
undress, lie down and generally submit to him in the tunnel, Sebold
tells us that “I became one with this man. He held my life in his hand.
Those who say they would rather fight to the death than be raped are
fools. I would rather be raped a thousand times. You do what you
have to do.”29
In reading Sebold’s rape narrative, I was especially struck by how the rapist
demanded not simply that she be passive and silent while he entered her, but also
required her to participate in her own violation and take on responsibility for
sustaining his erection and getting him to achieve orgasm. At one point, the rapist
insisted that Sebold “kiss back;” at another point, when he failed to have an orgasm
after the first penetration, he forced Sebold to give him a blow job and got angry
when she told him that she did not know how. His hostility and scorn for her were
palpable until he finally came—he repeatedly called her “bitch” and told her that

25
26
27

. SEBOLD, supra note 1, at 5.

29

. Id. at 7.

. Id. at 6.

. See also NANCY VENABLE RAINE, AFTER SILENCE 11 (1998). Raine offers another
description of rape in which penetration is not experienced as the central act or harm: “In the
scheme of things, his penis, although employed as a bludgeon, did not make much of an
impression. What he did with it was the least of my worries.” Id.
28
. SEBOLD, supra note 1, at 8.
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she was “the worst bitch he has even done this to,” a remark Sebold heard as being
“said in disgust” and also, coldly, “said in analysis ... [when] [h]e saw what he
30
bagged and didn’t like his catch.”
Part of Sebold’s survival strategy for the more than one hour she was in the
tunnel was to use her mind to escape. She explained how she went into her brain in
search of poems to recite, even mouthing the words, and mercifully felt numbness
in the lower half of her body. For Sebold, every part of her was taken and owned by
31
the rapist, “until all that remained unpossessed was [her] brain.” Echoing other

victim accounts of a phenomenon known as dissociation,32 Sebold
noted that, in a disembodied fashion, her brain “looked and watched
and catalogued the details of it all.”33
An important part of Sebold’s memory involves the response of the rapist. Up
until the time he achieved orgasm, he was angry. Immediately thereafter, he
indicated remorse, said he was sorry, called her a “good girl,” and even cried at one
34
point. From his demeanor and tone, it was clear that ejaculation was

a significant moment to him, likely the point of the attack. Tellingly,
Sebold cites his parting request that she kiss him good-bye as
indicating that “[i]t was a date to him.”35 However, right up to the
end, when she was finally allowed to dress and leave, Sebold could
focus only on preventing more violence and trying to placate her
attacker in any way she could, including telling him that she forgave
him. As she explained the “bargain,” she “would die by pieces to
save myself from real death.”36
B. The Aftermath

30
31
32

. Id. at 8.

34
35
36

. Id. at 12.

. Id. at 11.

. See Lori A. Zoellner et al., Peritraumatic Dissociative Experiences, Trauma
Narratives and Trauma Pathology, 15 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 49 (2002).
33
. SEBOLD, supra note 1, at 11.
. Id. at 13.
. Id.
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Like so many other significant experiences in life, the meaning of a rape is not
fixed at the moment of the attack but evolves over time, as the victim responds to
what has happened to her and witnesses others’ reactions to her and the rape.
Sebold’s memoir reveals the personal and social meaning of rape through its
numerous descriptions of how Sebold felt at various periods after the attack, how
the rape affected others’ perceptions of her, and how such social reactions in turn
influenced Sebold’s self-perception. As the title of the memoir suggests, in some
respects, Sebold was a fortunate victim: she had parents who supported her and
tried to help, friends who stuck by her, teachers who cared, and dedicated police
officers and lawyers who prosecuted her case. However, if there is message in
Lucky that stands out, it is that this was almost not enough.
Throughout the narrative, Sebold speaks of a “before” and an “after.” To say
that she felt like she was not the same person after the rape is an understatement.
Life was not just different for Sebold after the rape; rather, the rupture produced by
the rape was so profound it was as if the young woman Sebold had been before the
37
rape had suddenly died (or been murdered) and been replaced by another being.

In trying to articulate this grievous harm to identity, Sebold makes
the point that the dictionary definition of rape as “forcible
intercourse” is woefully inadequate, exclaiming that the dictionary
should “tell the truth” and disclose that “rape means to inhabit and
destroy everything.”38 A tragic irony for Sebold is that her singleminded focus on survival during the rape did not protect her from its
deadening after-effects.
Additionally, the realization that the rape had shattered her sense of self was
incredibly painful to Sebold, so much so that she tried to deny it at every turn.
When she first arrived back at home, for example, she acted tough and cracked a
joke about the rape, in a vain effort to convince herself and her parents that “I’m
39
still me.” And when her sister acted concerned that she might be

upset by what was on television, Sebold became angry because she
desperately wanted to believe that “I was still the same person I’d
always been.”40 Despite these attempts at recapturing her old life, the
trauma of the rape had an intensely separating effect on Sebold: she
felt like she lived on a “different planet”41 than her family.
Subsequently, in an interview, Sebold expressed the view that
“tabooed violence like a rape . . . is one of the most alienating
experiences that . . . you can have.”42
37

. Id. at 33 (“My life was over; my life had just begun.”); Id. at 113 (“In my mind,
the rapist had murdered me on the day of the rape.”).
38
. Id. at 123.

39
40
41
42

. Id. at 51.
. Id. at 60.
. Id. at 68.

. A Conversation with Alice Sebold (NPR radio broadcast, July 10, 2002)
(transcript on file with the Indiana Law Journal) [hereinafter Conversation].
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After the rape, Sebold began to see the world through the eyes of a rape victim,
43
dividing the terrain into “the safe and the not safe.” Like a cancer victim

who scans a room wondering who else has the disease,44 Sebold saw
violence everywhere,45 and felt most connected to those who had also
been the victims of violent acts.46 The violence loomed so large that,
oddly and tragically, Sebold remained psychologically linked to the
rapist himself. Sebold eventually came to the realization that she
shared her life “not with the girls and boys I grew up with, or the
students I went to Syracuse with, or even the friends and people I’ve
known since. I share my life with my rapist. He is the husband to my
fate.”47
The alienation produced by the rape was compounded for Sebold by the
distancing reactions of many persons around her once they learned that she had
been raped. Not unlike the response to someone who has a terminal disease or has
just suffered a death in the family, Sebold sensed that people were often
uncomfortable around her, which she interpreted as a statement that “I was no
48
longer like her but was other than.” The experience of the rape also

generated a feeling of self-loathing: Sebold believed she was ugly
and untouchable and kept involuntarily recalling the rapist’s words
that she was “the worst bitch” he had ever had.49
Throughout the memoir, Sebold recounts how time-worn stereotypes about rape
and rape victims colored the reactions of people towards her. For example, Sebold
had to counter the myth that it is physically impossible to rape a woman who is
unwilling, unless the rapist uses a weapon. Thus when Sebold’s father learned that
at the moment of penetration the rapist no longer had a knife, he became confused
and could not understand how the rape could have occurred. Sebold took her father
aside and patiently explained that when a rape is going on, even if the rapist has a
50
weapon, the probabilities are that “the weapon is not there, in her face.” She got

her father to understand that she had submitted out of fear, after she
had been overpowered and beaten up. Her father then appreciated
that it was indeed possible for a woman to be raped under such

43
44

. SEBOLD, supra note 1, at 90.

. See Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race:
The Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other-Isms), 40
DUKE L.J. 397, 397–98 (1991).
45
. See SEBOLD, supra note 1, at 80 (“In my world, I saw violence everywhere.”).

46

. Id. at 67 (“But what I remember is suddenly being in the presence of someone
who ‘got it.’ Not just knew the facts, but—as near as she could—understood what I felt.”).
47
. Id. at 53.

48
49
50

. Id. at 20.
. Id. at 21.
. Id. at 59.
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circumstances and saw the rationality in Sebold’s insistence that “I
couldn’t want something like that, it’s impossible.”51
Perhaps most strikingly, several persons seemed to equate Sebold’s rape with
“having sex” and made assumptions about Sebold based on that categorization. The
most explicit statement in this vein came from Sebold’s therapist, a self-identified
feminist, who joked that “I guess this will make you less inhibited about sex
52
now.” More subtly, an older family friend who had been brutally

attacked and beaten, but not raped, remarked that her experience was
different from Sebold’s because “[n]o one [was] interested in [her] in
that way.”53 This prompted Sebold to protest that she had been raped,
to underscore the similarity in their experiences.
The old portrait of a raped woman as forever ruined or spoiled also surfaced—
one woman, for example, tried to comfort Sebold by saying “it wasn’t such a bad
54
thing growing up to be an old maid,” implying that no one would want to

marry Sebold now. Sebold admitted that she internalized these
stereotypes and worried that no “nice boy” would want her.55 Even
Sebold’s boyfriend, who in some ways treated her lovingly, was
caught up with the idea of saving her, as if she were “a whore who,
by virtue of his imagination and sense of justice, he could raise to the
height of a lady.”56 The fallen woman image also lurked behind the
response of the local priest who prayed for Sebold’s soul as if she
were lost because she had done something wrong.57 Similarly, people
expected Sebold to exhibit shame, like a proper victim. Sebold was
stunned when some of her classmates at Syracuse seemed angry at
her for returning to school after the summer break, as if by returning
she had done something wrong.58
Interestingly enough, some people were attracted to Sebold precisely because
she was a rape victim. A few students at Syracuse, whom Sebold barely knew,
acted as if she were their best friend. Sebold speculated that “[k]nowing a victim is
59
like knowing a celebrity[,] [p]articularly when the crime is clouded with taboo.”

In another instance of treating rape as if it were only sex, the celebrity
seekers suggested that by being raped, Sebold had engaged in a
transgressive, sexual act.
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

. Id.
. Id. at 77.
. Id. at 68.
. Id. at 67.
. Id. at 69.
. Id. at 80.
. Id. at 65.
. Id. at 95.
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Much of the frustration and pain Sebold experienced from the reaction of even
well-meaning family, friends, and acquaintances stemmed from their readiness to
minimize the event. Because Sebold was thought to be a strong person, some
assumed that she would simply get over the rape in time. Sebold’s father even
made the insensitive remark that he was glad that if it had to happen, it happened to
her and not her sister, whom he apparently thought was too weak to withstand such
60
a trauma. The message sent by many was that Sebold should consider

herself lucky because, after all, she was alive and had merely been
raped.
C. The Prosecution
Unlike most rape victims, Sebold never seemed to harbor doubts as to whether
she should report the rape and assist in the prosecution. After an initial period of
61
extreme disorientation following the attack, she managed to walk back to

her dorm, attempt to contact her best friend, and eventually ask the
resident advisor to call the police. Sebold was first examined at the
hospital and given Demerol, which made her very groggy. When she
was subsequently interviewed by the police, she had a great deal of
trouble staying awake and did not appear credible to the investigating
officer. The officer’s original report left out many of the details of the
attack which he brusquely dismissed as “inconsequential” to the
charges.62 Sebold remembers that she “took each reprimand [by the
officer] for what it was: an awareness that the specificity of my rape
did not matter, but only how and if it conformed to an established
charge.”63 Her case was put in the inactive file, apparently because
the police did not believe her story and did not think she would return
to Syracuse after the summer.64
The case was prosecuted only because of the fortuity that Sebold happened to
see her rapist on the street one day after she returned to college from summer break.
He recognized her and smirked, asking her, “[H]ey girl, . . . don’t I know you from
65
somewhere?” When she rushed away, he was brazen enough to begin

speaking to a policeman who was standing not far away. Sebold tried
to memorize what he was wearing but was too stunned and afraid to
approach the policeman at that point. Thereafter, she reported the
60
61

. Id. at 57.
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. See id. at 14 (“I wasn’t there. I heard them outside of me, but like a stroke victim,
I was locked inside my body.”).
62
. See id. at 31 (“How he twisted my breasts, or shoved his fist up inside me, my
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sighting to the police, who immediately went into high gear in their
search for the assailant.
Race factored heavily into the identification and apprehension of Gregory
Madison, the man ultimately arrested and convicted of Sebold’s rape. Even before
she saw him on the street, Sebold was aware in her mind that she had linked the
rapist to black men in general and at first sight of him from behind thought that it
was “just a more intense version of the fear I had felt around certain black men ever
66
since the rape.” She only became sure of her identification after he

approached her and spoke to her.
By that time, Sebold had already realized that her rape by a black man had the
capacity to stimulate racist reactions on the part of those who wanted to protect her.
Shortly after the rape, she heard her father refer to the black men he saw on the
streets of Philadelphia as “animals,” a remark that seemed wildly out of character
67
for him. Most dramatically, the police officer who searched for

Madison after the sighting took time out to chase and beat up three
innocent black students he saw on the street, even though Sebold had
told him that they were too tall to be the rapist.68
As the case unfolded, the main issue was that of identification, as is common in
stranger-rape cases where the issue of consent is not likely to provide a plausible
defense. On this crucial issue, Sebold tripped up when she failed to identify
Madison in a lineup. As she subsequently explained her mistake, Sebold felt
69
intimidated by the close quarters of the lineup room and was thrown off

when a man who looked a lot like Madison stared right at her through
the glass, while Madison kept his head down. Sebold’s lawyer later
told her that the “ringer[]” for Madison was actually his friend, whom
Madison had used in other lineups to psyche out the victim.70 The
misidentification could have dealt a fatal blow to the prosecution if
the forensic evidence had been weaker—it turned out, however, that a
pubic hair, recovered from Sebold as part of the rape kit, perfectly
matched a sample taken from Madison.71
Sebold testified at trial and in front of the grand jury. Both of these experiences
were grueling for her, even though, as a virgin, she had no sexual past that the
defense could exploit to impugn her integrity. What made Sebold particularly tense
is that she knew her performance as a witness could make the difference between
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. Id. at 136 (“[T]he rooms I’d seen on cop shows were nothing like this one. . . .
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72

She felt exposed and shamed when she recited
what happened during the rape, and even when she admitted that she
had never had sexual intercourse before. Additionally, during the
process, Sebold figured out that she could not tell the whole truth and
expect to win. Instead, she chose to compromise and tell small
strategic lies, particularly about her thoughts and motivations. For
example, in response to a grand juror’s question as to why she was
walking in the park late at night, she quickly accepted blame, said she
was stupid and promised to warn other girls about the park.73 In fact,
the very question had “made her numb;” she believed that the jurors
were just not “getting it” if they could imply that she, rather than the
rapist, was somehow responsible for the attack.74
acquittal and conviction.

In many respects, Sebold’s case was favorable to the prosecution. In fact,
Madison chose a nonjury trial because, as Sebold’s lawyer put it, the “superficials”
75
of the case might sway a jury to convict. Because Sebold’s case was the

prototypical stranger-rape case, it gave the defense fewer
opportunities to shift the blame to the victim by suggesting either that
she welcomed or should have prevented the attack. Even before trial,
Sebold concluded that what was important was that:
I was a virgin. He was a stranger. It happened outside. It was night. I wore
loose clothes and could not be proven to have acted provocatively. There were
no drugs or alcohol in my system. I had no former involvement with the police
of any kind, not even a traffic ticket. He was black and I was white. There was
an obvious physical struggle. I had been injured internally—stitches had to be
taken. I was young and a student at a private university that brought revenue to
76
the city. He had a record and had done time.

Sebold, however, was not pleased that these factors, which she dubbed the
77
“cosmetics of rape,” would be central to proving her case. To a large

extent, she considered those factors irrelevant to what happened to
her in the tunnel and the enormous effect it had on her life.
At trial, the defense strategy was aimed at showing that Sebold was wrong in her
identification of Madison, and it hinged largely on race. Not surprisingly, the
attorney for Madison honed in on Sebold’s misidentification at the lineup. His line
of questioning suggested that Sebold had trouble telling black people apart and had
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. Id. at 174 (“It was saying the words out loud and knowing it was how I said them
that could win or lose the case.”) (emphasis in original).
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panicked when she saw a black man on the street who spoke familiarly to her.

78

The theory of the defense was that Sebold had simply connected
Madison in her mind to the rapist, the kind of involuntary cognitive
association that Sebold herself had noticed. To bring home the
salience of race to the case, Madison’s attorney asked her if she had
identified Madison at any time other than on the street. When she
replied that she had identified him earlier that day in court, the
attorney asked: “How many black people do you see in this room?”79
The question was meant to underscore that Madison was the only
black person in court.
The discussion of Madison’s race had the effect of compounding Sebold’s guilt
and made her feel powerless. She felt “guilty for the race of my rapist, guilty for the
lack of representation of them in the legal profession in the City of Syracuse, guilty
80
that he was the only black man in the room.” The questioning eventually

wore her down; she claimed that “this wouldn’t be the first time, or
the last, that I wished my rapist had been white.”81
D. Long-Term Effects
After the trial, everyone—most of all Sebold—wanted her to put the rape behind
her and for a time it seemed that she might be able to do just that. She stayed in
school, went out with friends, had a boyfriend, and believed that, unlike one of her
classmates who had been sexually abused growing up, she would not “wear the
82
rape eternally.” She was determined to “lose” her virginity by her own

choice, but her first sexual encounter after the rape was marred by the
resemblance it bore to the rape. Her partner seemed interested only in
his pleasure and was irritated when she did not respond in a way he
liked.83 Overall, the main message of the last portion of Sebold’s
book is that, despite her desire and efforts, she could not shed the
damaging effects of the rape.
By her own estimation, Sebold did not begin the process of recovery in earnest
until over a decade after the rape. Events in her life certainly did not help to speed
up the process. Most significantly, in her final year of college, Sebold’s roommate
was also raped. Although she tried her best to support her friend, Sebold was
deeply hurt when her friend decided not to press charges, to change roommates,
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and to stop speaking to Sebold, treating her as if she had a disease that was
84
“catching.”
Throughout this period, Sebold was extremely concerned about being safe. She
quit a job that required her to work at night, stopped going to poetry readings, and
often found herself in a state of “hypervigilance” where she imagined that someone
was lurking in the dark waiting to pounce. She had nightmares and began drinking
85
a lot. To reach the desired state of “oblivion,” Sebold also began using heroin.

She became depressed, stayed in bed and begin eating and gaining
weight.
It was not that Sebold was totally unable to function during this period. She
taught writing as an adjunct instructor at Hunter College and felt a genuine
connection to her students. She even began talking about her rape publically, and
86
published a first-person account in the New York Times Magazine in 1989. But

it was not until she read Trauma and Recovery that she realized that
she had been suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and had
exhibited many of the same symptoms as combat veterans returning
from Vietnam. She went into therapy and gradually began to feel
hopeful.
For Sebold, writing the memoir of her rape was an essential step to becoming a
novelist. She stated that she felt a need to record the facts of her own rape first, in
order to free herself from having to use fiction to “tell the real deal about every
87
detail of rape and violence.” Although several years had passed since her

rape, Sebold’s narrative is told in a confident tone with a sense of
immediacy. To stimulate her memory, she went back and read the
journals she wrote shortly after the rape. Interestingly, however, she
believed that her memory of the rape and the trial were better 5–7
years after the event, and even up to 10 years after, than it was in the
3–4 years afterwards.88 I read Sebold as believing that as long as
trauma blocks one’s memory, there can be little understanding, and
little chance for recovery.
II. RAPE TRIALS AND RACISM
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. Id. at 224.
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. Alice Sebold, Speaking of the Unspeakable, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1989, § 6
(Magazine), at 16.
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In one important respect, although Sebold’s story recounts a crime that took
place in the early 1980s, Lucky is very much a contemporary rape narrative. Lucky
is current because it takes account of race in a nonsuperficial way and attempts to
trace the effects of race on everyone involved. Sebold was fully aware that race was
relevant in her case, not only in the courtroom but also through her own and others’
responses to the rape.
By the time Sebold wrote her memoir, the topic of the interplay of race and rape
had received sustained and deep attention by scholars, social scientists, and
89
activists. In fact, perhaps the most lasting lesson of the black feminist

critique of feminism in the 1980s has been that the history of rape in
the United States, particularly the legal history of rape, is inseparable
from the history of racism.90
Our understanding of how racism affects rape and rape trials has come in small
pieces. At first, women of color and other diversity-minded feminists stressed that
skepticism toward rape victims and their presumptive lack of credibility did not
apply with equal force in cases where the victim was white and the accused was
91
black. In such situations, the tables could be turned, such that juries

and prosecutors might be too eager to credit the victim’s account,
raising the risk that an innocent man might be falsely accused. One
need only recall the famous Scottsboro Boys case and the lynching of
Emmett Till to realize that the ideology of racism made it easier for
whites to believe the myths that black men were prone to rape and
that white women would not voluntarily consent to have sex with
black men.92 Even in a post-civil rights society, with racially
integrated juries, such racist stereotypes proved resilient: social
scientists have documented that stricter sentences are meted out to
black defendants and those convicted of raping white women,
showing that the race of the victim as well as the race of the
defendant still matters.93 Most dramatically, initiatives like the
89
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Innocence Project have resulted in the release of black men who had
served long prison sentences for rapes that they could now prove they
did not commit, demonstrating the horrible consequences of the
system getting it wrong.94
The second piece of the diversity perspective on rape, which emerged most
forcefully after Anita Hill testified before Congress, focused on women of color as
victims of rape and sexual harassment. Writers such as Jenny Wriggins and Angela
Harris explained that racism not only resulted in disparately harsh treatment of
95
minority defendants, but also in less protection for minority victims. Because

women of color were stigmatized as being promiscuous by nature,
they were often regarded as unrapable, regardless of whether the
accused was a stranger or an acquaintance. The skepticism that
selectively affected white rape victims could harden into a near
imsuperable obstacle for women of color who were sexually
assaulted. They were perceived as departing too far from the
prototypical rape victim to make their stories believable.96 In cases in
which the accused was also black, moreover, victims might be
extremely reluctant to report the crime, both because of their mistrust
of the criminal justice system and also because they wished to avoid
being perceived as a traitor who lacked racial solidarity.97
The next and ongoing step in the diversity critique has been to construct an
intersectional theory of rape that explains the different ways sexism and racism
work together to affect individual experience and social understanding, and to alter
98
results in rape trials. In this more complex approach to rape, single-

pronged explanations, such as Estrich’s emphasis on acquaintance
versus stranger rape, are subject to criticism for being reductionist
and implicitly centering the experience of white women.99 In this
second generation of feminist theorizing on rape, there has been an
effort to identify with more precision the specific mechanisms of bias
that filter into social interactions and legal proceedings. Particularly
94
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with the help of narrative, writers have attempted to tease out the
content of various stereotypes, myths, and other social perceptions
that surround sexual violence and injury.
In this vein, Sebold’s book gives a complicated account of how her whiteness
simultaneously privileged and disadvantaged her legal case. Sebold readily admits
that because hers was a stranger-rape case with a white victim and a black
defendant, the odds favored the prosecution. This racial element was one of the
important “superficials” of the case, likely a key factor in persuading Madison to
100
Even if the decision had no determinative
waive his right to a jury trial.

effect on the ultimate outcome, it did spare Sebold the particular
ordeal of testifying in front of the trial jury. Particularly since Sebold
thought that the experience of testifying before a judge was
extraordinarily difficult, she may have been lucky not to have had to
endure a jury trial. As mentioned above, some questions posed by the
grand jurors indicated that they were not immune from blaming a
victim for failing to prevent her own rape.101 From this perspective,
Madison’s race may have afforded Sebold a strategic advantage by
channeling the defendant into making choices to minimize the risk of
racial bias, even if it took some pressure off his legal adversary, the
rape victim.
Sebold’s race may have also been a factor in the considerable effort put forth by
the police investigating the case, at least after their initial skepticism toward her
story. Once Sebold spotted Madison on the street six months after the rape, the
police seemed determined to find and arrest her attacker. Sebold’s case even
inspired the fury of one officer because she reminded him of his niece who had
102
It is doubtful that there would have been this
recently been gang-raped.

level of identification with, or desire to, avenge a nonwhite victim. Of
course, other confounding factors—particularly medical evidence of
Sebold’s virginity—may also have been influential in shaping the
police response.103
Although Sebold does not shy away from suggesting ways her race-privilege
potentially affected her case, she may not always have been aware of the extent of
that privilege. As critical race theorists have pointed out, white privilege is often
invisible, particularly when whiteness seems primarily to function as a background
104
For example, when Sebold expressed
color which is taken as the norm.
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anger at feeling guilty for accusing the only black man in the
courtroom, and wished that her attacker had been white,105 she did
not have occasion to ask what it might be like to be a woman of color
in her position, to be the only other person who looked like the
defendant in the whiteness of that courtroom. Despite her feelings of
racial discomfort and guilt, Sebold’s race may have subtly lessened
her sense of alienation as she negotiated the legal process, even if she
believed that, as the rape victim, she was indelibly separated out and
marked.
Sebold is most incisive when she details how Madison’s race hurt her case, or at
least how it made the case harder to prosecute. Her analysis goes beyond a
simplistic assertion that Madison’s attorney “played the race card,” although her
book implicitly makes that claim. Instead, Sebold explains how the fact that
Madison was black served to diminish her credibility as a complaining witness and
provided Madison with a defense in an otherwise indefensible case.
Unlike many contemporary backlash narratives which start from the premise
that discrimination is now visited primarily upon whites, however, Sebold appears
to embrace the view that white supremacy still exists and primarily harms
minorities. As I read her account, the problems in her case did not stem from either
a drive for black revenge against whites or a misguided impulse of political
correctness. Instead, predictable distortions in the process surfaced as the actors
tried, with varying degrees of good faith, to compensate for racism in our society.
Whether the rape being prosecuted is a stranger or an acquaintance rape, the
106
Despite
outcome often turns on the credibility of the alleged rape victim.

attempts at rape reform aimed at refocusing attention away from the
victim and onto the actions of the defendant,107 critical issues still
emerge during rape trials which depend on whether the accuser is
telling the truth and is giving an accurate account of events. The
importance of a victim’s credibility is easiest to see in acquaintancerape cases, in which the defendant asserts that there was no rape
because the woman consented. But as Sebold’s narrative so aptly
demonstrates, credibility can be crucial in stranger-rape cases as well.
As mentioned earlier, Sebold’s case did not involve a defense of consent. At
first, Sebold’s attorney worried that the defense might try to argue that Sebold lost
her virginity by having consensual sex with someone other than Madison,
subsequently regretting it, and then deciding to blame “any black man” she ran into

of whiteness); Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence: Making
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However, as the criminal proceedings progressed, it
became clear that the defense would not contest that Sebold had
indeed been raped, but would instead argue that this was a case of
misidentification.
on the street.

Tellingly, whether a consent defense is asserted or not, the race of the defendant
can nevertheless enter into the equation. In the consent scenario above, the victim
assertedly fabricates the story of rape to cover up her own indiscretion and immoral
behavior. This is a familiar script that rape victims of an earlier era often
109
It was then thought that sex outside of marriage was so
confronted.

stigmatizing for a woman that it was not surprising that women
would cry rape to save themselves from disgrace. Now that the
stigma of premarital sex has lessened, the script seems to have been
updated to inject a racist response from a victim. The twenty-first
century version of the script is that a white victim selects a black
man—any black man—to pin the crime on, presumably because of
the stereotypical association of black men and crime. The possibility
of such racist opportunism on the part of rape victims has been
rendered plausible by some high profile murder cases.110 The
possibility of such a “racial hoax” was planted in the public
consciousness by the infamous Stuart murder case which took place
in Boston.111 In that case, a husband tried to cover up the murder of
his pregnant wife by claiming that a black stranger was the
perpetrator. The chilling case of Susan Smith, who drowned her
children and initially pointed the finger at an anonymous black man,
is a similar narrative.112 The principal difficulty with deploying this
theory in a rape case is that it still requires the defense to come up
with a reason why the victim would lie about having consensual
sex,113 even if it explains why she might single out a black defendant
to blame.
In Sebold’s case, where the issue became one of accuracy of identification, the
defense did not need not prove Sebold was a liar, but only that she was mistaken.
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As explained by her attorney, the defense strategy would be to portray Sebold as
114
Race would then come into play to supply a
confused and panicky.

reason why Sebold might make a mistake about something as
important as the identity of her attacker. In the misidentification
scenario, the story was that Sebold was attacked by a black man and
in her mind connected black men, in general, with the rapist. The
defense then would attempt to convince the judge that Sebold’s
memory of the rape could not be trusted, that she singled out
Madison because he was a black man who spoke familiarly to her on
the street.115 In Sebold’s particular case, of course, her failure to
identify Madison in the lineup bolstered the defense theory;
presumably, if she could make a mistake at the lineup, she could also
be wrong about Madison being the rapist.
What Sebold’s narrative reveals is how intricately race can be implicated in
basic questions of accuracy and credibility in a rape trial. It should be emphasized
that Sebold felt sure of her identification—she had been with Madison in the tunnel
for an hour; he had spoken to her throughout the attack; and details of his body, his
116
features, were firmly etched in her memory. According to Sebold, the fact that
she had been tricked and intimidated at the lineup only served to worsen Madison’s
crime against her. The lineup, however, did not shake her faith in her own
assessment of what had happened.
At the same time, Sebold realized that, since the rape, she was more fearful of
117
and, in that sense, Sebold had made a mental
“certain black men,”

association between race and rape. Sebold’s reaction is not surprising
given that social psychologists tell us that race is one of those highly
salient personal characteristics that tends to stick in one’s memory,
often playing a leading role in the causal scripts that people
commonly rely on to explain events.118 The more difficult question
was whether this racialized fear induced by the rape would manifest
itself in confusion and inaccuracy when it came to making a personal
identification.119
In addition to highlighting the potential racial residue of the rape, race was
potentially implicated in Sebold’s case in three other ways. First, the defense
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suggested that because Sebold was white, she might have less familiarity with
black men and thus would be less able to make an accurate identification of a black
man. In essence, this claim is that, to a white woman, particularly a woman who
had suffered the trauma of a sexual assault, black men tend to look alike.
Madison’s attorney tried to make it seem that Sebold felt certain of her
identification only because the defendant was the sole black man in the courtroom.
Subsequently, Sebold’s attorney “rehabilitated” her testimony by eliciting
testimony to the effect that Sebold came into contact with many black men during
120
If the case were tried today,
the course of her everyday life at college.

Madison’s attorney might also have sought to introduce an expert
witness to testify about the risks posed by cross-racial identification,
and, in a jury trial, to ask for a cautionary instruction about the
unreliability of such identifications.121
The second way that race played into Sebold’s case was that it affected the
actions of those involved in the case. After the rape, Sebold witnessed how her
122
as if the
father suddenly grew angry at the sight of black men on the street,

cause of his daughter’s rape was society’s failure to control black
criminality. The Syracuse police officers also took out their anger by
beating up innocent black students,123 again seeming to link Sebold’s
rape to a general propensity on the part of black men to engage in
sexual violence. These racist responses were not introduced as
evidence in the case. The testimony stuck more closely to facts
relevant to Sebold’s credibility as a witness and did not delve into the
motives and actions of the police. By including these facts in her
narrative, however, Sebold provides support for a defense theory that
Madison was plausibly a victim of racial injustice.
Finally, from Sebold’s account of her own testimony, the defense may have tried
to construct a particular racialized portrait of Sebold to undermine her credibility.
As mentioned above, the defense hoped to cast doubt on Sebold’s identification by
portraying her as a confused, panicked, young girl who could not be trusted to be
accurate. During cross-examination, in particular, the defense attorney questioned
Sebold extensively about her actions following the rape and her sighting of
124
Although she was the rare victim who reported
Madison on the street.

the rape very shortly after it happened, and notified the police after
she saw Madison on the street, the questioning was designed to
ridicule Sebold for first calling her parents, and consulting friends in
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the dorm before going to the police.125 In addition to making Sebold
feel uncomfortable on the stand, the suggestion that her reactions
were that of an immature girl seemed to spillover and to trivialize her
injury. Similarly, several questions were directed at what Sebold was
wearing at the time of the rape. After Sebold testified that she was
wearing “Calvin Klein jeans, blue work shirt and a heavy beige
cable-knit cardigan sweater,”126 the defense attorney made it a point
to repeat “Calvin Klein” when referring to her pants, apparently in an
attempt to conjure up an image of the kind of girl who would wear
Calvin Klein jeans.127 Overall, the tone and line of questioning
created the impression of a flighty, young, privileged white girl who
shouldn’t be taken too seriously. It is interesting that this portrait
tracks what feminist theorist Catharine MacKinnon describes as the
stereotypical image of a white woman: “effete, pampered, privileged,
protected . . . and self-indulgent . . . who alternates between
fantasizing about fucking black men with accusing them of raping
her.”128
In her book, Sebold does not attempt to add up the race-linked advantages and
disadvantages to her case and calculate a net gain or loss. Instead, the evaluation of
race that implicitly emerges from her narrative is a complex one that has the ring of
truth. Sebold seems to accept that Madison’s race potentially affected the legal
process. Being a black man accused of raping a white woman, Madison had to deal
with the social perception that black men have a propensity to rape and to counter
the contrast the prosecution would inevitably draw between him and the young,
white, female victim. Sebold’s story reveals that her accusation itself stimulated
race prejudice among the police and others and that Sebold herself could not be
color-blind, even if she wished it were not so.
The major challenge for Sebold as the victim in this case was to present herself
and her testimony in such a way as to counter the apprehension that racism had
infected the legal process. She could not just tell her story and have confidence that
the truth would prevail, although she stated that she got through some tough parts
of the questioning by “listening to what I knew to be the truth and I spoke from that
129
Instead, she was also forced to counter a racialized
place.”

stereotype of herself as a false accuser and to try to persuade the
125
126
127

. See id. at 194.
. Id. at 125.

. Id. at 125–26, 194. Recall the Brooke Shields advertisement for Calvin Klein
jeans: “Nothing comes between me and my Calvins.” See David Cole, Playing by
Pornography’s Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 178
n.137 (1994).
128
. Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman
Anyway?, 4 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 13, 18–19 (1991) (describing the image as one of
“sexualized infantilization”).
129
. SEBOLD, supra note 1, at 185.

http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art15

judge that her story was trustworthy. It is not easy for a rape victim to
have to defend her position at the same time she is being reminded of
the humiliation and crushing fear of the attack. Sebold’s frustration at
having to defend herself against an implicit charge of racism
indicates that she, as well as Madison, might have been better off if
racism in the criminal justice system were not such a pervasive
reality.
III. THE SEX/VIOLENCE DICHOTOMY
A great virtue of narrative over theory is its ability to transcend false
“either/and” dichotomies and present a nuanced “both/and” picture of social
phenomena. Thus, in her narrative, Sebold did not have to take a position on
whether her rape was more like our familiar prototypes of “violence” than “sex” or
how closely her experience resembled that of victims of crimes that do not have a
sexual dimension. Instead, her story provides details of how rape as a particular
form of sexualized violence felt to her, how others perceived it, and the various
social meanings attached to it.
At the outset I should say, however, that because Sebold found nothing
pleasurable, instructive, or exciting about her rape, her descriptions resonate mostly
as violence, with sex modifying the type of violence, rather than the other way
around. I believe that Sebold would find it insulting to describe her rape as violent
sex.
When 1970s feminist reformers insisted that rape was violence, not sex, they
were making a strategic move in response to the traditional attitude that found it
difficult to see the harm in rape because of its superficial resemblance to sexual
intercourse. Equating rape to sex has so many ramifications that it is impossible to
specify them all. Among the most noticed are: how it eclipses the way in which
rape often harms its victims in a pattern similar to other violent crimes and
traumatic experiences; how it makes it extremely difficult for sexually experienced
women to convince others that they have been victimized by rape; how it provides
a reason to believe that women secretly wish to be raped, even if they later deny it;
and how it serves to normalize violence in intimate relationships. Many activists in
the anti-rape movement proceeded under the assumption that unless the connection
between rape and sex were severed, there would be little hope of treating rape as a
serious crime and little chance that women would not be blamed for provoking or
failing to prevent rape. One rape survivor has stated, for example, that rape is one
of the “most insidious” crimes precisely because “[i]t is the only crime of violence
130
that masquerades as sex.”
One staple in feminist analyses of rape is that, to understand rape, it is important
to listen to the accounts of victims and to grasp the experience from the victim’s
131
The sexist prototype of rape as a species of sex stems
perspective.
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largely from interpreting the encounter from the eyes of the
perpetrator, who might indeed label the event as “having sex.” In this
regard, Sebold’s narrative is particularly instructive; her attempt to
remember and recount exactly what happened during the rape reveals
the absence of anything resembling sexual desire or excitement on
her part, but a very different response from Madison.
As I read her gut-wrenching account, Sebold was fixed on survival. Her
overriding emotional reaction to the attack was fear for her life. There is nothing in
Sebold’s account, for example, to suggest that she was primarily interested in
protecting her virginity or preventing penetration. From the moment the attack
began, Sebold was afraid that Madison would kill her and tried everything she
could think of to stop him from doing that. Tellingly, if Sebold were forced to
single out the most painful part of the attack, I doubt she would select the moment
of penetration. Her narrative indicates that what the law (and the police) found to
be most significant and consequential did not correspond to her assessment of the
harm.
In contrast, Madison’s conduct revealed that he was focused on having an
orgasm. His demeanor changed markedly after he came; the violence then
subsided, and he expressed concern for Sebold’s well being, calling her a “good”
132
Sebold’s lawyer explained to her that Madison
and a “beautiful” girl.

fit the profile of a “power rapist.”133 According to studies, power
rapists are generally incapable of sustaining an orgasm, and to do so,
they must feel that they have completely dominated their victim,
physically and emotionally.134 For Madison, the violence was
entwined with his sexual pleasure and orgasm. To call Madison’s
experience “violent sex” thus seems far more fitting than applying the
same term to what Sebold endured. The choice of language seems to
matter here, suggesting an implicit alignment with either the victim
(violence) or the perpetrator (sex).
As if to underscore that Sebold did not regard the rape as a sexual encounter, she
resisted the characterization that she had “lost” her virginity as a result of the rape
and instead insisted that it had been taken from her. She “called what [she] still had
135
expressing in that phrase the hope that she
to lose” her “real virginity,”

would have sex for the first time some day. A similar reaction was
reported by Nancy Venable Raine in the memoir of her rape when
she explained that “I didn’t feel like I’d had ‘sex’ with the rapist. I
simply felt my body, including my sex organs, had been attacked.”136
A decade earlier, legal theorist Lynne Henderson had made the same
132
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impassioned distinction between rape and sex by asserting that:
“Rape does involve sexual organs, and is overwhelmingly a crime of
one gender against the other, but it is ludicrous to call it sexual . . . .
A crime which confronts its victims with death is not sex.”137
The adamancy with which these particular rape survivors strive to separate sex,
on the one hand, from violence and rape, on the other, suggests that there is more at
stake here than a possible category error. Their insistence also makes me question
the stock answer that the violence/sex dichotomy is a just another false dichotomy
of social experience that must be discarded. What seems crucial here—and what
Sebold’s book helps to illuminate—is just what it is about these rapes that threatens
to be obscured when we think about them as sex or perhaps even sexualized
violence.
In Sebold’s painstaking replay of precisely what happened during the rape, she
noted that although some of Madison’s actions did not have independent legal
significance, they were of overriding importance to her. For example, Sebold was
struck that when the police officer took her statement about the rape, he did not
seem to care that Madison had twisted her breasts or shoved his fist up inside
138
These actions were not just physically painful to Sebold; she
her.

had sustained other injuries to her face and body from the struggle
and overpowering that she did not specifically mention to the officer.
I believe that for Sebold these actions were of particular importance
because they proved that Madison had treated her as something less
than a person,139 as an object over which he had compete control. To
be subjected to this extreme form of objectification is shocking to an
individual and creates an acute kind of vulnerability.
Sebold also made a point of recounting that she found kissing Madison—and the
memory of kissing Madison—to be particularly painful. When she was asked about
140
In a
it on the stand, Sebold felt that the question went “right to my heart.”

memorable passage, Sebold revealed that “[t]he kissing hurts still[,]”
and confessed that “the fact that it was only under my rapist’s order
that I kissed back often seems not to matter. The intimacy of it
stings.”141 Her intense negative reaction to something so ordinary as a
kiss suggests that the action took on a radically different meaning in
the context of the rape. As she explains, it was not the kiss alone that
137
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hurt, but the fact that she was forced to kiss back. The injury is not
simply an unconsented-to touching, like the definition of battery in
tort, but includes being forced to participate in one’s own injury.
Indeed, one stark theme that emerges from Sebold’s description of
her rape is that Madison succeeded in making her feel complicit in
her own rape. Sebold was not only forced to kiss Madison, give him a
blow job, and help him keep his erection, she also found herself lying
to him—telling him that he was “strong” and even saying that she
forgave him—in an effort to appease him and save her life.142 It is
striking that if there were a tape recording of the words spoken during
the rape, it might seem as if Sebold had consented or perhaps was
even enjoying the encounter.
143
For Sebold, to give in to Madison in this way was to “die by pieces.”
It was
not only that she was rendered powerless to act in a way she desired,
but that the source of her injury was another human being who
intentionally hurt her.144 To be disabled from offering physical
resistance and to be forced to participate against one’s will is itself
injurious and a harm that is often overlooked or discounted when
women are victims. Although Sebold’s rape was certainly
humiliating and degrading, that description does not begin to capture
the injury that Madison’s domination produced in this case.
Over time, Sebold’s injury may have been compounded by the profound
misunderstanding of her experience by many of those around her. It was here that
the culturally dominant prototype of rape as sex was most pronounced, preventing
even well-meaning people from being of much help. One assumption that was
particularly galling to Sebold was that the rape had somehow transformed her from
145
Although it
a virgin to a sexually experienced (and less inhibited) woman.

was technically true that Sebold was no longer a virgin—she had bled
during the rape and her hymen had indeed been broken—the
assumption was infuriating to Sebold because it suggested that she
had gained something worthwhile from the rape, that the rape had
altered her status from novice to experienced. This conception of
what took place falsely implied agency on Sebold’s part, given that
most people gain experience only through exerting effort.
Additionally, those who treated Sebold as if she were a “fallen” woman implied
that Sebold had been seduced or tricked into having intercourse, and was a victim

142
143
144

. Id. at 12–13.
. Id. at 13.

. See also RAINE, supra note 27, at 254–55 (“As in torture, the source of the injury
[of rape] is another human being acting intentionally, not an inanimate object or an accident
of nature or man.”) (emphasis in original).
145
. SEBOLD, supra note 1, at 50.

http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art15

146

In addition to
erroneously placing Sebold in the same category as women who had
chosen to have sex, the assumptions overemphasized the sexual
aspects of the attack and, by doing so, risked obscuring the violence.
Thus, Sebold’s insistence on comparing her experience to that of a
family friend who had been brutally attacked, but not raped, can be
seen as her attempt to re-center the focus on violence, whenever the
sex/violence dichotomy surfaced.147 Finally, the reactions of some
students at Syracuse who treated Sebold like a celebrity148—a
response that seems quite contemporary and does not draw upon
nineteenth-century images of fallen women—nevertheless arose from
thinking about rape as exotic, as a form of sex that not many people
have the opportunity to experience. I believe that this view, like the
older images, did not sit well with Sebold because they afforded a
positive valence to rape and shifted the focus away from the harm
and injury.
of her own bad choices, rather than a victim of a violent rape.

Even in this case of violent stranger rape, there is a danger that force will be
mistaken for choice if the encounter is viewed through the lens of sex. It is entirely
possible that the lies and stratagems that Sebold employed in an effort to save her
life could be reinterpreted as the kind of “negotiations” that are thought to go on
between men and women in ordinary sexual encounters, for example, deciding
149
Particularly when
whether Sebold or Madison would take off her belt.

many take a commodified view of sexual relations generally150—
under the model that men desirous of sex “bargain” with women to
“give it up”—it is not a far cry to regard rape as just another bad deal.
Rejecting both the discourses of commerce and sex, Sebold’s
narrative goes to great lengths to convey the idea that there is a world
of difference between having a low level of bargaining power and
being completely powerless as a rape victim.
Reading Sebold’s account of the aftermath of her rape, I get the impression that
it would not have been easy to be a friend to her in those days. Even if one
appreciated that to Sebold, her rape was not just “bad sex,” or the result of a
constrained choice, it might have been difficult to talk to her about it. There is a
Catch-22 here, because anything that reminded Sebold of her powerlessness could
also make her feel ashamed. Like so many victims of discrimination or crime,
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Sebold resented being put into the category of “victim.” Interestingly, Sebold felt
very distant from the counselors at the rape crisis center, in part because of “their
use of generalities” and their reporting of dismal statistics on the success of rape
151
prosecutions.
At that moment, Sebold felt that, to survive, she had to

resist being “one of a group or compared with others.”152 This coping
strategy, even though it may have been a form of denial, shielded
Sebold from the debilitating realization that her terrifying experience
was not so unique.
What we can glean from Sebold’s narrative, of course, is not enough to end the
debate among feminists as to whether maintaining the dichotomy between sex and
violence is strategically useful. But it is clear from her memoir that Sebold seems to
want to hang onto the distinction. It is not that Sebold’s rape did not affect her
subsequent sexual relationships or alter her sense of her own sexuality. Indeed,
Sebold admits that for a long time after the rape, sex was not a pleasurable
experience for her and that she stayed focused on her partner’s pleasure to get her
153
In part because of flashbacks to the rape and the
through it.

association of sex with the rape, Sebold had to concentrate hard to
prevent pain, “like gritting your teeth on a frightening carnival ride
that those around you appear to enjoy.”154 In these descriptions of
“bad sex,” Sebold aligns herself with Lynne Henderson, who also
wishes to put rape in a category by itself, as qualitatively different
from “bad sex,” which she views as “not particularly pleasurable[,]”
but “not scary, or deadening or shaming.”155 The key difference for
each seems to be, as Henderson puts it, that “women who have
experienced bad sex do not feel raped, because they were exercising
some agency, and their partner did not abuse them, ignore them, or
deny their humanity.”156
Because it focuses only on her own experience, Sebold’s narrative does not
explore what sex might feel like to women who are pressured to have sex by their
employers, teachers, dates, or acquaintances, but who are not physically
overpowered by a man they believe is intent on killing them. In an effort to
circumvent the sex/violence dichotomy, some theorists envision a continuum of
“consent” that ranges from the kind of violent stranger rape that Sebold
experienced; to date and acquaintance rapes that are “ringed” by violence; to
blatant forms of sexual harassment and exploitation where sex is extracted by
means of economic pressure; to instances of “bad sex,” where women decide to
have intercourse for reasons other than their own sexual pleasure; to sex
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But even with
such a continuum, there is still the temptation to draw a line at a
particular point, placing violence on one side and sex on the other.
characterized by mutuality and respectful communication.

Catharine MacKinnon argues against drawing a distinction between violence
and sex because she believes that normal heterosexual relationships, rarely
158
classified as violent, often do violate women.
Her biggest concern is that

unless the sex/violence dichotomy is disrupted, we will not be able to
redefine “violence” and “violation” from a woman’s perspective, and
that the force and coercion in ordinary relationships will remain
hidden. In this respect, her concern is the obverse of Sebold’s, who
was more interested in assuring that her rape not be assimilated to
ordinary sex.
In an early essay, MacKinnon speculated that the reason some feminists held
onto the sex/violence dichotomy was that they were afraid to be “against sex,” and
that the specter of Freud was still potent enough to make them concerned with
159
being labeled “repressed Victorians.”
Although it may still be politically

unwise to be seen as “against sex,” it is MacKinnon’s, not Freud’s,
shadow who looms larger these days. The strong backlash against
feminism, particularly the backlash against dominance feminism
associated with the philosophy of MacKinnon,160 has produced a
misreading of MacKinnon that is so widely recited it is sometimes
the only thing people know about feminist legal theory. The popular
notion is that MacKinnon believes that all intercourse is rape. As I
interpret the reaction to this popular “wisdom,” it is that MacKinnon
must be wrong, so wrong in fact, that much “rape” must really be sex
after all. Put another way, MacKinnon’s insistence that there is no
bright line between violence and sex—designed to uncover the force
in normal heterosexual intercourse—can be twisted to cast doubt on
the harm of rape of all sorts and to prove that we have gone too far to
regulate sex.
It is not surprising that, as skepticism toward rape victims is again increasing,
feminists might wish to dust off the violence/sex dichotomy. A similar move to
desexualize sexual harassment has been made by scholars such as Vicki Schultz,
who fear that the worst abuses of gender harassment in the workplace are not being
addressed because harassment has become too closely identified with sexual
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161

In the context of sexual harassment,
the concern is that an emphasis on the “sexual” overshadows other
kinds of gender bias (e.g., refusals to train, sabotage of work, sexist
evaluations of performance) that call women’s competency and
fitness to work into question. That harassment may take both
sexualized and non-sexualized forms, and that the two are often
intertwined, can easily get lost in litigation. Reminiscent of the
sex/violence dichotomy debate, the refrain here is that harassment as
a form of discrimination and abuse should be distinguished from
conduct motivated by sexual desire.
propositioning and sexual advances.

Sebold’s memoir underscores for me that MacKinnon had a point when she
argued that it is not enough to insist that violence against women be noticed and
appreciated (and not mistaken for sex), without also taking on the difficult task of
redefining violence from the victim’s perspective. Despite Sebold’s description of
her experience as one of violence (not sex), much of what was so devastating about
her rape was the sexualized domination imposed by Madison. Madison treated
Sebold as an object for sexual domination, took no account of her feelings or
desires, and insisted that she become an active participant in the rape. It would be
hard to deny that the intense feeling of powerlessness Sebold experienced during
the rape, and the shame and hurt associated with the memory of that feeling, were
not linked to Sebold’s being a woman and a rape victim. In this respect, Sebold’s
story very much resembles the eroticized dominance that MacKinnon sees as
emblematic of heterosexual relationships. Indeed, one reason Sebold’s narrative is
so powerful is because it describes the injuries produced by eroticized domination
so well, even if it cannot answer critics of MacKinnon who insist that ordinary sex
looks nothing like this.
IV. TRAUMA AND IDENTITY
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Just under the surface of the violence/sex debate over rape lies the related
question of the nature of the harm and whether it makes sense to think about rape
as a distinctive harm, separate from other forms of violent assault. Despite the
feminist push to treat rape as violence, there has also been a feminist resistance to
approaches that classify rape as mere ordinary violence. Perhaps the most famous
of these approaches is Michel Foucault’s comment on the problem of punishing
162
Like many contemporary postmodern theorists, Foucault was
rape.

primarily concerned with deregulating sexuality and only secondarily
with articulating a justification for continuing to punish rape within
that deregulated framework. At a 1977 roundtable, Foucault
remarked that:
when one punishes rape one should be punishing physical violence and nothing
but that. And to say that it is nothing more than an act of aggression: that there
is no difference, in principle, between sticking one’s fist into someone’s face or
one’s penis into their sex . . . . It isn’t a matter of sexuality, it’s the physical
violence that would be punished, without bringing in the fact that sexuality was
163
involved.

The very idea of equating rape to a punch in the face probably would have
seemed ludicrous prior to the second wave of feminism in the United States. For
much of our history, the harm of rape had been tightly linked to women’s honor
and to the honor of husbands and families of the rape victims. Within this
conceptual frame, women were thought to be dishonored by rape, because rape
signaled that women had engaged in illicit sexual intercourse, were no longer
innocent or chaste, and as a result, had lost their value as sexual objects, and hence
as wives and daughters. Husbands and families of rape victims were similarly
dishonored by rape because it was thought that they had been robbed of their
valuable property, and had lost out in the competition for status and power waged
164
For many women, of course, the dishonor of rape is a
among men.

present reality. Critical race feminist Adrien Wing has explained, for
example, that in more traditionally patriarchal societies, rape victims
continue to be perceived as “soiled and unmarriageable” and often
become a “target of societal ostracism.”165 In extreme cases, raped
women who have been impregnated by the rape have even been
prosecuted for fornication, while the rapist goes free because of a
lack of male witnesses to the crime.166 Most dramatically, the war in
162
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the former Yugoslavia has served to focus the world’s attention on
the plight of Bosnian women in that sexually conservative Muslim
society, in which being raped often leads to social rejection and being
compelled to live a life without marriage and children.167
Viewing rape as a harm principally to women’s honor, however, seems to be on
the decline in the U.S., at least in the old version of honor. One significant
objective of the rape reform movement in the United States has been to try to erase
this particular stigma from rape. And it does seem that we hear less these days
about rape victims being spoiled for marriage or the shame that rape causes the
victim’s families. While a woman’s reputation can still be hurt by being raped,
particularly if her account is not fully credited, the shame and injury of rape to its
victims can no longer be captured by the concept of dishonor. With dishonor
displaced as the prime injury of rape, Foucault’s “move” to conceptualize rape as
mere physical aggression has more purchase and, not surprisingly, has caused a stir
168
among intellectuals.
I read Sebold’s memoir as an eloquent rejection of the view that rape boils down
to mere physical aggression. Her narrative is compelling and emotionally powerful
precisely because the injury of her rape was not as easy to explain as a punch in the
face and had a far greater impact on her life than, say, a car accident that caused
similar physical injuries. In addition to the psychic injury produced by Madison’s
brutal domination of her during the rape, Sebold experienced the rape as a life
altering event that left its imprint years after the attack. The single word that best
captures what Sebold describes is “trauma.”
The significance of rape in the lives of its victims can be seen by the fact that
many survivors take special note of the “anniversary” of their rape. It is not that the
occasion is meant to be celebrated. Rather, Nancy Venable Raine explains that the
date of her rape took on a meaning akin to that of a birthday because it marked the
beginning of her life as a different person, replacing the life of the woman she had
169
Sebold had a similar response to her rape. In
been before the rape.

some important way, Sebold believed that “[m]y life was over; my
life had just begun” as a result of the rape.170
Statements, such as Sebold’s, that emphasize a “before” and an “after” are
useful to symbolize the enormity of the event in the eyes of the victim. They
indicate that, although the vocabulary of honor may no longer be widespread, the
injury of rape still manages to go to the core of a person and is felt so deeply that it
requires the image of death to convey a sense of its dire effects. It may be that we
no longer believe that rape is so dishonorable to a woman that it is better to die than
to be raped. Sadly, however, many women feel like they have died as a result of
rape and must constantly struggle to remake their lives after rape. Indeed, the term
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“survivor” as used to describe a rape victim is meant to convey this sense of rape as
a life threatening event, and not simply that many rape victims are actually killed
by their attackers.
Robin West has theorized that rape as a form of violence is both distinctive and
deeply gendered. She claims that one reason that the experience of rape is difficult
171
to make “intelligible” is that there is “simply no correlate in (most) men’s lives.”

Her argument is that rape is different from ordinary violence in that it
involves a harmful invasion of the woman’s body by the man’s penis
and simultaneously creates a threat of further violence that terrorizes
the victim. For West, “[t]his coupling of unwanted and painful sexual
penetration with the experience of terror . . . is the most genderspecific aspect of the experience of rape.”172 Other scholars have
continued to emphasize the significance of penetration, but have
expanded the concept of penetration by asserting that penetration
need not involve the penetration of the vagina by a penis. Under this
view, penetration of any orifice by a penis or other object will suffice
to constitute
rape. For Ann Cahill, for example, rape is distinctive not because it
typically involves female victimization but because “to penetrate the
body of an unwilling other is by definition a more invasive, more
destructive act than any that stops at the surface of the body.”173
As I read Sebold’s description of her rape, it is not clear whether she would
endorse either West’s or Cahill’s definitions of what is distinctive about rape. The
invasion and terror that both theorists describe certainly does seem to fit Sebold’s
narrative. However, because Sebold places less emphasis on the penetration aspect
of her assault, it leaves me wondering whether the inclination of some feminists to
question the significance of penetration as the defining act of rape deserves
174
It is also possible, moreover, that the social
renewed attention.

meaning of rape—one that is hard to separate from penetration—
affected the terror Sebold experienced, even if she did not
specifically dread penetration more than other aspects of the assault.
What seems abundantly clear is that, for Sebold, the rape brought with it a
radical change in perspective. After the attack, it seems fair to say that Sebold saw
the world through the lens of a victim of violence: she categorized places,
situations, and people, first and foremost, as either safe or unsafe. She became
preoccupied with the prospect of violence in the knowing way of someone who has
been there before. The rape also changed how Sebold related to other people.
Mostly, it set her apart from others and produced a sense of profound alienation.
When she did feel a connection to other people, it was likely to be to a person who
had also experienced rape or violence.
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I would describe the sea change in Sebold’s life associated with the rape as
175
Her memoir relates how the trauma
constituting a change in her identity.

of the rape shattered her sense of self and changed her alignments to
people in her world. This harm to identity appears to have both an
internal and external dimension—it involves personal feelings and
suffering, but also a social side, affecting Sebold’s interpersonal
relations and her presence in the community. Because it straddles the
personal and social, as well as the public and private, identity as a
construct does a better job of capturing the harm of rape than merely
labeling it a form of physical aggression. It may be the closest thing
we have these days to honor.
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It is also important to note that Sebold describes herself as having suffered post176
She claims that
traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) as a result of the rape.

this realization came slowly to her, only after she had undergone
therapy, had published an essay about her rape, and then finally
recognized herself in “the case histories of the sick,”177 found in
Trauma and Recovery. In her own behavior, Sebold identified many
of the classic symptoms of PTSD—hypervigilence, nightmares, sleep
disorders, ultra-sensitivity to noise—and felt it significant that
Herman had cited her New York Times essay in the “trauma,” but not
in the “recovery” portion of her book.178 Sebold was particularly
struck by
the links Herman made between Vietnam veterans and rape victims.
In her memoir, Sebold mentions a good friend—a Vietnam veteran—
who had been instrumental in getting her to see that she had not yet
recovered from her rape. The friend had been surprised by the depth
of his own delayed emotional response, many years after watching
his buddies get blown-up in Viet Nam, and remarked to Sebold:
“Who would have thought that something that long ago could have
such power?”179 Sebold identified so strongly with some veterans’
first-hand accounts that their stories opened up something in her that
allowed her “to begin to feel.”180 She saw them as courageous in
battle, yet so shattered by trauma that “the hero could not hold.”181
Sebold also accepted a psychoanalytical explanation for why she decided to live
in New York City for so many years after the rape, leading a constricted life in
which she feared for her safety and “self-medicated” with drugs and alcohol to dull
the pain. In this account of her life, New York served to re-create the environment
of her rape because New York City meant violence to Sebold, and her wary
responses seemed more normal there than in sunny California, where she
eventually moved. The re-creation of the violent environment oddly “reassured”
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She felt that “she fit right in with it[,]” that it “made
sense.”
Sebold
thus appears to accept the idea that one way to gauge the continuing
impact of a trauma such as rape is to see whether the victim feels
compelled to re-create it, despite desperately wishing to leave it
behind.
Sebold.
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However, despite Sebold’s endorsement of Herman’s approach to trauma, it
would be a mistake to read Sebold’s memoir as a statement that PTSD, or a similar
medical diagnosis, tells the complete story of the harm of rape. What Sebold
experienced cannot be captured by reciting the symptoms of PTSD. Indeed, her
experience would be blunted by such a medicalized account of her injury. As her
narrative attests, Sebold’s story is far too specific and far too saturated with
meanings beyond the realm of the individual and the psychological to be regarded
184
simply as a case study of trauma in the clinical sense.
Lucky looks for the meaning of trauma from multiple angles. It fits within the
genre of recent feminist writings that call for an investigation of the social and
cultural dimensions of trauma and that seek an “understanding [of] traumatic
feelings not as a medical problem in search of a cure but as felt experiences that can
185
Under this account, trauma is a
be mobilized in a range of directions[.]”

useful discourse for feminists precisely because it resists being
pinned down, and “challeng[es] distinctions between the mental and
physical, the psychic and social, and the internal and external as
locations or sources of pain.”186 In this broader sense, Lucky is a
memoir of trauma that would still be a great book, even if PTSD had
never been recognized as a mental disorder.
CONCLUSION
In Lucky, you will find a story of one woman’s rape that provides the opening to
think deeply and concretely about some of the most vexing and important issues
that surround scholarly discussion of rape and rape law today. Now that many
students think about the rape reforms of the 1970s as the product of “old school”
187
we are badly in need of a sequel of “real rape” for a new
feminism,

generation. Alice Sebold’s memoir fills that need by speaking to race,
sexual violence and trauma with the honesty and intensity the subject
still so urgently requires.
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